… the Poles will be leaning – very visibly – in the next few weeks of masses and memorials make the most recent New York Times column by Stanley Fish particularly topical.

He’s reviewing a book by Jurgen Habermas, titled An Awareness of What is Missing, in which Habermas — long associated with the view that “the authority of the holy,” is in the process of being successfully replaced, in modern, secular culture with “the authority of an achieved consensus” — seems to change his mind. Fish writes:

In recent years … Habermas’s stance toward religion has changed. First, he now believes that religion is not going away and that it will continue to play a large and indispensable part in many societies and social movements. And second, he believes that in a post-secular age — an age that recognizes the inability of the secular to go it alone — some form of interaction with religion is necessary: “Among the modern societies, only those that are able to introduce into the secular domain the essential contents of their religious traditions which point beyond the merely human realm will also be able to rescue the substance of the human.”

What’s missing, then, is the “substance of the human,” “normative guidance” …

[The] modern Liberal state, … Habermas reminds us, maintains “a neutrality . . . towards world views,” that is, toward comprehensive visions (like religious visions) of what life means, where it is going and what we should be doing to help it get there. The problem is that a political structure that welcomes all worldviews into the marketplace of ideas, but holds itself aloof from any and all of them, will have no basis for judging the outcomes its procedures yield. Worldviews bring with them substantive long-term goals that serve as a check against local desires. Worldviews furnish those who live within them with reasons that are more than merely prudential or strategic for acting in one way rather than another.

The Liberal state, resting on a base of procedural rationality, delivers no such goals or reasons and thus suffers, Habermas says, from a “motivational weakness”; it cannot inspire its citizens to virtuous (as opposed to self-interested) acts because it has lost “its grip on the images, preserved by religion, of the moral whole” and is unable to formulate “collectively binding ideals.”

The liberal citizen is taught that he is the possessor of rights and that the state exists to protect those rights, chief among which is his right to choose. The content of what he chooses — the direction in which he points his life — is a matter of indifference to the state which guarantees his right to go there just as it guarantees the corresponding rights of his neighbors (“different strokes for different folks”). Enlightenment rational morality, Habermas concludes, “is aimed at the insight of individuals, and does not foster any impulse toward solidarity, that is, toward morally guided collective action.”

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You see the moral paralysis Habermas has in mind in a recent interview about the burqa with historian Joan Wallach Scott in Salon.

Scott insists that “One can’t assume …that [the burqa] signifies oppression.”

Why then, her interviewer asks, “does the [burqa] so dominate conversations about the rights of Muslim women?”

Well, that’s an interesting question. I think it is a way of avoiding talking about the discrimination Muslims (men and women) face in Western societies, a way of indicating “our” superiority to “them,” of blaming “them” for the discrimination they suffer, a way of depicting “them” as less modern, less enlightened than “us.”

There are, that is, no standards of enlightenment or modernity among us. As Scott’s quotation marks suggest, there’s no us. There are only bunches of people making choices and suffering discrimination as a result of some of those choices.

Muslim women, Scott says, must be choosing the burqa. Some of them must be choosing it. Enough of them for our liberal states to honor their choice.

We’re forced into this assumption because we have no general moral point of view from which we could assume otherwise, or, more importantly, from which we could put aside questions of the motivation of these women and instead defend our own set of collective moral principles.

Scott seems unable to perceive, in other words, the evisceration of “the substance of the human” that the burqa makes visible to pretty much everyone else.

On a deeper level, defending our own set of collective moral principles would be, for Scott, a logical absurdity, since we don’t exist (only individual choosers or groups of choosers exist). And its realization would be an abomination, since acting collectively on behalf of what can only be, as she describes it, a self-aggrandizing myth, would make us savage bigots.